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1. Introduction 
The degradation of natural resources raises a variety of issues related to rural livelihoods, poverty, 
distribution of income and inter-generational equity. Land degradation also deprives smallholders 
and particularly the poor of a key resource and diminishes capacity to undertake critical 
investments, possibly leading to depletion of buffer stocks and increased vulnerability. These 
problems are most pronounced in areas with widespread poverty and fragile ecosystems such as 
arid, semi-arid and highland regions (Pender and Hazell, 2000; Shiferaw and Bantilan, 2004).  In 
such areas sustainable intensification of agriculture through land conservation and management is 
a critical policy challenge.  
 In recognition of the importance of land degradation for rural livelihoods, governments and 
development partners in East Africa have devoted substantial resources to developing and 
promoting soil and water conservation technologies. These methods are diverse and include both 
indigenous and introduced practices for combating soil erosion and nutrient depletion, improving 
water conservation and enhancing productivity. Structural methods are often promoted through 
donor financed projects (e.g. food for work) and include soil or stone bunds and terraces.  
Agronomic practices include minimum tillage, organic and inorganic fertilizers, grass strips and 
agro-forestry.  These techniques aim to reduce soil erosion while increasing organic matter and 
                                                 
1 Corresponding author: c/o ICRISAT, P.O. Box 39063-00623, Nairobi, Kenya. Email: b.shiferaw@cgiar.org 
 2 
increasing nitrogen fixation. In addition, water harvesting techniques like tied-ridges, planting 
basins, check-dams, ponds, tanks and bore wells provide farmers the opportunity to plant early and 
better utilize available moisture for plant growth and reduce reliance on unpredictable rains 
(Baidu-Forson, 1999). 
Despite the growing policy interest, widespread adoption of sustainable management 
techniques outside of intensively supported projects has been limited (Fujisaka, 1994; Pender and 
Kerr, 1998; Barrett et al, 2002).  A review of the literature suggests that while there is still 
inadequate understanding of the role of market, policy and institutional factors in shaping 
incentives for adoption, deficiencies in terms of market and policy failures can create important 
barriers to smallholder adoption of sustainable land management (SLM)  (Zaal and Oostendorp, 
2002).    
This chapter reviews the challenges smallholder farmers face in tackling the long-standing 
problem of land degradation and offers new insights into how market incentives, institutional 
factors and macroeconomic policies affect adoption and adaptation of land and water management 
technologies.  The paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the evolution of 
approaches to soil and water conservation. Section three provides a broad conceptual framework 
for analysis and evaluates challenges. Section four presents a review of factors that condition the 
use of sustainable land and water management. Lastly, section five offers conclusions, key lessons 
and implications for policy and future research.   
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2. Evolution of Approaches for Sustainable Land and Water Management  
Concern with land and water degradation in smallholder agriculture is not new. Over the years 
considerable effort has gone into getting smallholder farmers to mitigate land degradation and 
adapt existing techniques to local conditions. Reducing soil erosion and associated nutrient 
depletion has been a particular priority and due to off-site effects like siltation of reservoirs and 
waterways, governments have often intervened to reduce soil erosion and runoff in hilly areas.  In 
semi-arid regions the focus is often on capturing and utilizing surface and groundwater.  Most 
efforts have met limited success.2   
Conservation promotion approaches can be grouped into top-down, populist or farmer-first 
and neo-liberal (Biot et al, 1995). Most of the land management interventions by colonial 
governments were top-down command-and-control type policies that did not involve smallholder 
farmers and were driven by fear of inaction.  Policies included forced adoption of erosion control, 
planting of trees and protection of water/river catchments. Until the mid-1980s several countries in 
East Africa used similar policies (e.g. see Shiferaw and Holden, 1998; Pandey, 2001). These 
approaches largely failed and created serious barriers to innovation. 
The failure of command-and-control led to the so-called “populist” approach, which largely 
rejected external technology development and extension and made the farmer the center of soil and 
water conservation programs. Chambers et al (1989) is emblematic of this approach, stressing 
small-scale, bottom-up interventions, often using indigenous technologies (Reij, 1991).  Although 
the idea of putting farmers first is noble, implementation was difficult, leading to a broader 
approach in which farmer innovation is affected by economic, institutional and policy 
environments (Biot et al, 1995; Robbins and Williams, 2005).  
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The neo-liberal approach focuses on incentives that prevent the use of land and water 
management technologies. This framework recognizes the role of farmer innovation, but highlights 
the critical role of markets, policies and institutions for farmer innovation, adoption and 
adaptation. The critical importance of making conservation attractive and economically rewarding 
to farmers through productive technologies and access to markets are regarded as key to success.   
Growing recognition of the public good characteristics of soil and water conservation and 
the non-technical factors that condition technology choice have led to strategies that internalize 
local externalities at the community and landscape levels (Pagiola, 1998; Reddy, 2005; Kerr et al, 
2007). Soil conservation provides off-site benefits that include better water quality and flood 
control for downstream users (Ribaudo, 1986; Fox et al, 1995; Colombo et al, 2006).  Integrated 
watershed management (IWM) aims to improve both private and communal livelihoods through 
technological and institutional interventions. IWM goes beyond traditional soil and water 
conservation to include collective action, networking and market-related innovations that support 
and diversify livelihoods. This concept ties together the watershed with community and 
institutional factors that determine viability and sustainability. Linking the watershed with the 
community can help develop technologies and local collective action to internalize externalities 
and stimulate investments that address community-wide resource management problems (Shiferaw 
et al, 2008a).  
In the last few years soil and water conservation has recognized design complexities and 
the need for broadening partnerships and disciplinary analyses and moved toward sustainable 
land/water management (Robbins and Williams, 2005). There is no single definition for SLM.  
Hurni (2000) suggests that SLM implies “a system of technologies and/or planning that aims to 
integrate ecological, socioeconomic and political principles in the management of land for 
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agricultural and other purposes to achieve intra- and inter-generational equity.”  The following 
section builds on this concept of SLM and develops a conceptual framework for understanding the 
market, policy and institutional factors that affect investment in conservation. Understanding the 
drivers of these decisions will allow the design of win-win SLM strategies that reduce poverty and 
increase agricultural output.  
   3. Conceptual Framework  
Small farmers in many developing regions produce and consume the same commodities, which 
means that investments in land and water management are likely to be influenced by factors related 
to both production and consumption. This is especially true when farmers operate under imperfect 
information and market conditions that prevent them from producing for sale and profits. Our 
framework presented in Figure 1 presumes that farm households pursue livelihood strategies 
constrained by a variety of factors as they make decisions about natural resources and investments. 
The framework is premised on Chambers (1987) and the farmer-first principles, but also 
incorporates farm household behavior under market imperfections (de Janvry et al, 1991), 
economics of rural organization (Hoff et al, 1993), economic policies (Heath and Binswanger, 
1996) and institutions (North, 1990).  
Figure 1 here 
Smallholder farmers make production and investment decisions in each period to maximize 
net benefits, subject to existing assets and expected shocks.  These two factors determine 
vulnerability. Decisions are affected by socioeconomic and policy environments, institutional 
changes and infrastructure that determine relative prices and access to technologies and markets 
(Shiferaw and Bantilan, 2004). Market access is further influenced by information imperfections 
and the high search costs that prevail in many developing countries (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005). 
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Institutional factors affect sustainable land and water management through legal frameworks, 
property rights and farmer participation in networks.  In cases like watershed management, 
collective action may support individual production and investments.  
Household assets and the prevailing biophysical, socioeconomic and institutional 
environments jointly determine the livelihood options and investment strategies available to 
farmers.  Access to input and output markets, technologies and the resulting prices then define the 
feasible production set and determine the optimal investment strategies.  Enabling and efficient 
institutions (e.g. secure rights to land and water and functioning credit and extension systems) also 
support investments that provide opportunities to intensify production, diversify livelihood 
strategies and potentially combat resource degradation.  
The interplay of technological and institutional factors can spur households to pursue 
potentially sustainable intensification that improve livelihoods.  In the absence of enabling policy 
and institutional environments that encourage technological innovation, farmers lack the incentives 
to use SLM technologies.  Indeed, lack of viable technological options and adverse biophysical, 
policy and institutional environments can encourage exploitative and unsustainable livelihood 
strategies, leading to synergies between poverty and resource degradation and potentially 
downward spirals (Scherr, 2000).  
Efficient use of SLM is also affected by SLM’s public good nature. The costs of 
conserving land and water are paid by investors, but the benefits accrue to agents well beyond the 
farm. Significant offsite SLM benefits present challenges, because they can lead to under-
investment. This is particularly true when, as is often the case, the effectiveness of conservation 
investments depends on treating an entire catchment or micro-watershed; this requires collective 
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action and landscape-wide cooperation, but such cooperation often involves costs and leads to 
additional market failures.  These issues are discussed further in Section 4. 
4. Determinants of Conservation Investments 
Investment in SLM is often just one of many investment options available to farmers.  One 
way to model behavior is to suppose farmers compare the expected costs and benefits of all 
options and invest in those that offer the highest net returns (Kerr and Sanghi, 1992; Pagiola, 1998; 
Lee, 2005); farmers therefore switch from old to new methods when they gain in terms of net 
returns, lower risks or both.  Particularly with large off-site benefits, highest private returns might 
come from investments other than in soil and water conservation; adoption will therefore be 
inhibited unless subsidies are offered. 
The conceptual framework presented in Section 3 identifies factors that condition the 
adoption and adaptation of soil and water management intervention in smallholder agriculture. In 
the context of Figure 1, in addition to environmental factors, determinants can broadly be 
categorized as policy and institutional and market, poverty and risk.  These are discussed below. 
 4.1 Agricultural Policy and Institutional Factors  
In the past decade there has been an increasing recognition that policy and institutional 
arrangements play important roles in sustainable management of natural resources (Heath and 
Binswanger, 1996; Barbier, 2000; Pandey, 2001; Zaal and Oostendorp, 2002; Reddy, 2005). We 
focus on some of the most direct influences of agricultural policies on SLM investments.  Though 
there is a movement to reintroduce some targeted subsidies for fertilizer, seeds and irrigation 
(Kelly et al, 2003), unlike in some Asian countries (e.g. India), most countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa (except Malawi) have done away with agricultural input and investment subsidies.  Public 
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support for irrigation water and infrastructure is an important example.3  In India, as in many Asian 
countries, irrigation water is typically free and electricity subsidized (Reddy, 2005).  These 
policies distort incentives and can create disincentives for investment in soil erosion control and 
conservation of available water (Reddy, 2005; Shiferaw et al, 2008a). They can also encourage the 
planting of water-intensive crops, often in semi-arid regions, and SLM investments may be short-
lived as farmers resort to old practices once subsidies are withdrawn. The bottom line is that while 
subsidies can be justified by market and institutional failures, there is a need for careful appraisal 
of such policies. 
Institutions are the rules, enforcement mechanisms and organizations that help shape 
expectations and behavior and facilitate market and non-market transactions. They transmit 
information, mediate transactions, facilitate collective action, regulate property rights and contracts 
and help internalize externalities. Of special importance for SLM are property rights, collective 
action and social networks.  
Access and security of rights to land, water and other natural resources are important, 
because if property rights are weak farmers cannot capture the full benefits of their investments 
and therefore incentives to invest in SLM may be reduced (Ahuja, 1998; Barrett et al, 2002; 
Shiferaw and Bantilan, 2004).  However, empirical evidence on the effect of land ownership rights 
on SLM is mixed.  Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) review thirteen studies that assess the impact of 
land ownership on adoption of SLM in several countries. They find that in two cases owned land is 
better maintained, but in three cases the opposite is found and in the rest there is no relationship.  
When SLM provides important flood and soil erosion control in community watersheds 
there are public goods externalities and incentives for private investments may be limited.  In such 
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cases interdependence of resource users will require collective action and cooperation to achieve 
socially desirable conservation outcomes. Evidence suggests policies and institutions that induce 
and sustain collective action can play a significant role in the conservation and management of 
communal resources. Ahuja (1998) and Gebremedhin et al (2003) examine the effects of collective 
action on adoption of conservation technologies in Cote d’Ivore and Ethiopia and find that 
collective action supports adoption of conservation practices by helping farmers address market 
failures and overcome information constraints.  
Networking among farmers, including participation in the design of land management 
technologies, has an important role in influencing farmers’ attitudes and perceptions. Networking 
facilitates access to information about benefits and risks and as we have seen lack of farmer 
participation may explain why many past interventions failed (Reij 1991; Tiffen et al, 1994; 
Robbins and Williams, 2005).  In contrast, participatory interventions incorporating collective 
action have been relatively more successful (Joshi et al, 2004; Shiferaw et al, 2008b). 
Technologies resulting from such processes take into account the unique socio-economic 
characteristics of farmers, allowing adaptation to specific circumstances.  Farmers are able to test 
practices at their own pace and in their preferred sequences, typically leading to compatibility with 
local farming systems (Robbins and Williams, 2005). Participatory approaches also allow farmers 
to gradually adapt technologies to changing conditions (Bunch, 1989) and learn from one another. 
4.2 Markets, Poverty and Risk 
Studies that examine the relationship between commodity prices and land and water 
management find mixed effects (Barrett, 1991; Bulte and van Soest, 1999; Litchenberg, 2006). The 
ambiguous effects are not surprising, because higher commodity prices increase the returns to land 
management and therefore land value (Litchenberg, 2006), but also can make soil degradation 
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more attractive than other possibilities. For instance, increases in the price of agricultural outputs 
can mask the effect of land degradation, making erosive practices attractive to farmers.  When 
conservation does not provide obvious financial returns, an increase in the price of an erosive crop 
may encourage expansion without investment in SLM.  In other cases, though, increased 
commodity prices may make SLM profitable for farmers and a number of studies find positive 
relationships between prices and adoption (e.g., Bulke and van Soest, 1999; Shiferaw and Holden, 
2000; Lee, 2005). Shiferaw and Holden (2000), for example, find that in highland Ethiopia when 
conservation offers short-term gains, increases in prices spur adoption of SLM.   
Government price supports can undermine sustainable land management by distorting the 
incentives faced by resource users. Price supports to irrigated crops like rice and wheat can 
discourage farmers in semi-arid areas from cultivating sorghum and other water-efficient crops. 
Well-intentioned policies to promote food security could therefore lead to extensive land 
degradation and depletion of groundwater resources.  
A major determinant of adoption is cost, its absolute magnitude and relative to benefits. An 
increase in the price of fertilizer, for example, generally reduces its application (Pattanayak and 
Mercer, 1997). However, fertilizer subsidies can result in land degradation as found in China and 
South Asia (Pingali and Rosegrant, 1994; Heerink et al, 2007). Heerink et al (2007) find, for 
example, that policies to lower the fertilizer-rice price ratio have lead to compaction and soil 
degradation.  Other studies investigate how the cost of hedgerow cropping, terracing, minimum 
tillage, no tillage, etc and agricultural water harvesting techniques affect adoption and find inverse 
relationships between cost and adoption (Pattanayak and Mercer, 1997; Baidu-Forson, 1999; 
Robins and Williams, 2005).  
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A number of studies examine the role of market access on use of SLM.  Most find that 
when farmers face the costs of land degradation, land rights are clear and supportive policy and 
institutional mechanisms exist, improving access to commodity and input markets reduces 
transaction costs and improves the likelihood of SLM adoption (Reardon et al, 1997; Zaal and 
Oostendorp, 2002).  For example, the largely semi-arid Machakos district in Kenya suffered 
serious soil erosion problems in the 1930s due to failed colonial soil conservation policies, but by 
the mid 1980s the district had largely brought soil erosion under control while also increasing per 
capita income (Tiffen et al, 1994; Pagiola, 1998; Barbier, 2000). This tremendous success has 
partially been attributed to market access caused by good road infrastructure and proximity to 
Nairobi (Pagiola, 1998; Zaal and Oostendorp, 2002; Robbins and Williams, 2005). Zaal and 
Oostendorp (2002) indeed argue that the commercialization of agriculture generated the incomes 
needed to finance SLM investments.   The effect can also move in the opposite direction; Shiferaw 
et al (2008b) find evidence from Adarsha watershed in India that adoption of land management 
and complementary technologies for improving productivity help farmers diversify into high value 
and marketable crops. This suggests that SLM can reduce production risks, increase marketable 
surplus and facilitate the transition from subsistence to commercial farming.  
The relationship between labor market performance and investments in SLM are quite 
mixed (Reardon and Vosti, 1997; Pender and Kerr, 1998; Holden et al, 2004; Robins and 
Williams, 2005).  In the Ethiopian highlands where on-farm returns to family labor are low, 
Holden et al (2004) show that increased opportunities for off-farm employment have positive 
effects on household welfare, but reduce conservation investments. Similarly, Shiferaw and 
Holden (1998) find a negative relationship between off-farm income orientation and maintenance 
of conservation structures. Pender and Kerr (1998) find that when labor and credit markets work 
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poorly, higher income households are more likely to invest in SLM.  Kerr and Sanghi (1992) find 
fewer conservation investments around large Indian cities with active off-farm labor markets than 
in more remote areas.  Reardon and Vosti (1997) find similar results in their study of Rwanda, 
Burundi and Burkina Faso.   
In contrast to these findings, Tiffen et al (1994), Pagiola (1998) and Scherr (2000) review 
cases across Sub-Saharan Africa where off-farm employment increases soil and water conservation 
investments, perhaps by reducing the intensity of resource use.  But generally the literature finds 
the opposite and offers two main reasons for the negative relationship between labor market 
performance and SLM investments. First, all else equal when labor markets work well workers 
face higher opportunity costs and prefer to allocate labor off-farm. Second, off-farm employment 
often overlaps with the slack season and reduces labor available for conservation. 
Another important factor conditioning adoption and adaptation of conservation 
technologies is risk. Smallholder farmers face constant difficulties managing health, climate and 
socioeconomic shocks and SLM interventions that increase variability or uncertainty of incomes 
tend to be shunned by farmers. Such risks can arise from greater crop failure (due to biotic and 
abiotic stresses), poor and unreliable access to markets or insecure property rights. Whereas soil 
and water conservation generally tends to reduce production risks, there may be circumstances 
when risks increase.  For example, Shiferaw and Holden (1998) find that in Ethiopia soil and stone 
bunds cause pest infestation and even flooding.  An example where SLM reduces risk is water 
harvesting and irrigation in semi-arid areas used as part of strategies to cope with and adapt to 
drought and climatic shocks (Shiferaw et al, 2008b). In addition to risks associated with 
conservation technologies, uninsured production risk may cause farmers to under-invest in all 
areas, including SLM (de Janvry et al, 1991).  
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Product, credit, labor and insurance markets in rural areas of many developing counties 
tend to be either missing or highly imperfect. Input and output market access is often constrained 
by poor transport and communication infrastructure, fragmented supply chains, resulting in high 
transaction costs that undermine commercialization (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005; Poulton et al, 
2006) and reduced SLM adoption (Pender and Kerr, 1998).  Using large-scale survey data from 
Uganda, Pender et al (2004) test the effect of distance to all weather roads and nearest markets on 
commercial crop production and soil erosion.  They find that market distance is not correlated with 
production or erosion.   Pender and Kerr (1998) examine the impact on SLM adoption of 
incomplete and missing input and output markets in semi-arid areas of India. They find that both 
reduce profitability of investments and adoption.  
Access to credit is especially important for adoption of land management interventions like 
irrigation, terracing, tree planting, and fertilizer use, because of heavy upfront cash requirements 
(Holden et al, 1998; Shiferaw and Holden, 2000), but in most rural areas in East Africa credit 
markets work very poorly.  Households must therefore rely on their own assets and several studies 
show that assets (including human capital) influence investments in conservation (Reardon and 
Vosti, 1995; Holden et al, 1998; Scherr, 2000; Swinton and Quiroz, 2003).   The role of education 
and other forms of human capital on adoption of land management interventions has been 
particularly widely studied (e.g. Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007).  Human capital increases the 
likelihood farmers perceive land degradation as a problem and may increase managerial ability, 
helping farmers process information about technologies.  However, if off-farm options like 
migration and nonagricultural wage employment are available, more education can increase the 
opportunity cost of labor and reduce incentives to invest (Swinton and Quiroz, 2003) 
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Most land management investments like the fanya juu terraces promoted in the Machakos 
District of Kenya require large initial investments, but deliver a flow of benefits over many years.  
Due to imperfect capital markets and associated high costs of borrowing combined with limited 
own resources, most resource-poor farmers have short planning horizons (Holden et al, 1998). 
These horizons can discourage adoption of technologies that may not offer immediate benefits, but 
as illustrated in Figure 2 improve livelihoods only in the long run.  
Figure 2 
Using Figure 2 let us assume Options 1 to 4 offer different income streams from adoption. 
The resource degrading practice is Option 1, with incomes falling over time. Under the next best 
conservation option (Option 2) incomes decline too, but more slowly. As is typical for many land 
management investments, net income in the first few years is lower than without investment, but 
higher thereafter. At the same time, such investments tend to generate external benefits that 
farmers often omit in their computation of benefits. For instance, investment in soil conservation 
can reduce degradation of downstream fishing grounds and irrigation water bodies. Evidence 
indicates that if farmers face only these two alternatives, resource-conserving technologies are 
unlikely to be adopted (Holden et al, 1998), because in environments of imperfect markets poor 
farmers lack the capacity to absorb initial income losses. Unless subsidized, farmers may not be 
interested in such options (Shiferaw and Holden, 2001; Pagiola et al, 2002).  
Alternatively, if farmers have access to Options 3 and 4, there will not be such tradeoffs 
between current and future incomes and one would expect widespread adoption. A key challenge 
is that many of the available SLM technologies are not like Options 3 and 4.  Identifying, 
developing and promoting the most suitable SLM technologies and making those approaches 
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incentive-compatible in environments of highly imperfect markets is perhaps the most important 
challenge facing promoters of SLM. 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This chapter reviewed the challenges that small farmers face in tackling land degradation 
and presented a broad conceptual framework for understanding SLM investments within the 
context of imperfect factor markets, inadequate property rights and weak organizational and 
institutional arrangements. Our review of the literature suggests that resource poor farmers, 
especially in marginal and rain fed regions, face complex challenges in adopting and adapting land 
management innovations. Approaches to soil and water conservation have evolved over time, with 
the conventional wisdom now encouraging farmer participation and consideration of the market, 
policy and institutional factors that shape behavior.  
Farmer participation in the design of conservation technologies and availability of 
information about potential benefits and risks have important roles to play in influencing farmers’ 
attitudes and perceptions. Past interventions that followed top-down approaches failed and were 
subsequently replaced by participatory conservation that takes into account the unique socio-
economic characteristics of farmers, allowing adaptation to specific circumstances; linking 
research with indigenous innovation processes may be especially important.  
Some types of land degradation may not be directly visible to farmers, especially when 
external factors make it difficult for farmers to attribute changes to declining resource quality. 
Farmers will adopt technologies only if they perceive soil and water degradation as a problem that 
affects their livelihoods (Fujisaka, 1994; Cramb et al, 1999; Baidu-Forson, 1999). Along with 
participatory design, education about new options and the process of resource degradation are 
critical to stimulating awareness and action by individuals and communities.  
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Commercialization of agriculture and better market integration generally raises the returns 
to land and labor in agriculture. When complemented by policies and institutional mechanisms to 
induce innovation and adoption, thicker more accessible markets can be important drivers of 
sustainable intensification. Given that poverty and lack of farmer capacity can be major limiting 
factors, access to credit at affordable rates and availability of pro-poor, profitable conservation 
technologies are key steps.  
Unless conservation provides higher expected benefits than unsustainable options, farmers 
cannot be expected to adopt them and several studies have shown that the net gain from adoption 
of SLM can be negative. In the presence of significant market failures and when the social gains 
are higher than the costs, conservation subsidies may be justified.  With pervasive offsite effects 
and market failures that hinder landscape-wide interventions, stimulating wider use of SLM will 
also require new kinds of institutional mechanisms for empowering communities through 
collective action. This chapter has shown that the interests of smallholder farmers and society may 
not always coincide in attaining social objectives for sustainable use and management of land, 
water and other vital resources. There is a critical need for additional research to identify policies 
and institutional reforms that overcome market and policy failures in smallholder agriculture and 
stimulate investments in SLM.  One of the most innovative approaches to help poor smallholder 
farmers adopt more sustainable practices is payment for environmental services (PES).  Under PES 
beneficiaries of environmental services compensate farmers who invest in protection and supply of 
ecosystem services (Pagiola et al, 2002; Pagiola et al, 2005). Pagiola et al (2005) find that PES 
schemes can reduce poverty while internalizing the external benefits of conservation. There is a 
need to test, develop and adapt such innovations to create greater incentives for beneficial 
conservation of land, water and agro-ecosystems in the African region. 
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Figure 1. Factors conditioning smallholder natural resource investments and development 
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